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Within an agent-based model where moral classifications are socially learned, we ask
if a population of agents behaves in a way that may be compared with conservative or
liberal positions in the real political spectrum. We assume that agents first experience a
formative period, in which they adjust their learning style acting as supervised Bayesian
adaptive learners. The formative phase is followed by a period of social influence by
reinforcement learning. By comparing data generated by the agents with data from
a sample of 15,000 Moral Foundation questionnaires we found the following. (1) The
number of information exchanges in the formative phase correlates positively with
statistics identifying liberals in the social influence phase. This is consistent with recent
evidence that connects the dopamine receptor D4-7R gene, political orientation and
early age social clique size. (2) The learning algorithms that result from the formative
phase vary in the way they treat novelty and corroborative information with more
conservative-like agents treating it more equally than liberal-like agents. This is consistent
with the correlation between political affiliation and the Openness personality trait
reported in the literature. (3) Under the increase of a model parameter interpreted as
an external pressure, the statistics of liberal agents resemble more those of conservative
agents, consistent with reports on the consequences of external threats on measures of
conservatism. We also show that in the social influence phase liberal-like agents readapt
much faster than conservative-like agents when subjected to changes on the relevant
set of moral issues. This suggests a verifiable dynamical criterium for attaching liberal or
conservative labels to groups.
Keywords: sociophysics, agent-based model, Bayesian learning, moral foundations, opinion dynamics
1. Introduction
A central controversy in moral psychology and sociology deals with understanding the variety of
moral values and whether adherence to one set or another have a genetic origin or arise from social
interactions. Political affiliation has been associated to social interaction, to genetics and to the
combination of both (e.g., 1–5). We address questions about early age socialization, cognitive styles
and political orientation within a Moral Foundation theory (MFT) perspective using agent-based
modeling and techniques from information theory. The present work is culturally situated within
the fields of sociophysics [6–8] and computational social sciences [9–11] and is a companion to our
previous work [12–14].
In a series of papers Haidt and coworkers [15–21] have described MFT, an empirically driven
theory dealing with the foundations of moral psychology. It aims to understand statistically
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significant differences in moral valuations of social issues and
their association to coordinates of the political spectrum. The
core tenet of the theory is that moral issues, which are valued
mostly in an intuitivemanner, can be parsed into a number of dis-
crete dimensions, at least five, possibly six or even more. Accord-
ing to Kohlberg and Turiel [22], Power et al. [23], and Gilligan
[24] dimensions representing care/harm and fairness/cheating
should be enough to span the space of moral issues. Shweder et al.
[25] argued that the dimensions should be three instead.
TheMFT states that dimensions representing loyalty/betrayal,
authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation should also be
included in themoral space. The care/harm and fairness/cheating
dimensions are statistically more important for liberals than the
rest, and each dimension of the entire set is of similar importance
for conservatives. Culture wars would be a consequence of these
differences.
Consideration of other political cultures, such as libertarians
leads to yet other dimensions, such as liberty/oppression [26].
Political affiliation is also correlated with some characteristics
of the Big Five personality traits. Openness and liberal values
appear together frequently while Conscientiousness and conser-
vatism are positively associated (e.g., 27). Further associations
between cognitive learning styles and political affiliation have
been suggested by EEG experiments [28].
In constructing the Motivated Social-Cognitive perspective
Jost et al. [29], Jost and Amodio [30] make the assumption “that
conservative ideologies—like virtually all other belief systems—
are adopted in part because they satisfy some psychological
needs.” We have also followed in our previous work [13, 14] a
motivation driven approach with a totally different methodology:
studying mathematically the dynamics of agent-based models
using information theory. We considered the discomfort asso-
ciated to disagreement [31] and the motivating pressure was to
reduce pain associated to social exclusion. This was implemented
by a learning dynamics designed tomaximize a utility function or,
equivalently, minimize an energy-like function. Haslam [32] cor-
rectly argues that not all social figuring is or should be a matter
of cost/benefit calculation. In a third person description, within
a mathematical language, we calculate, but the social agent does
not calculate, it just acts and the dynamics proceeds as if agents
were actually maximizing a utility function. Similarly, a rock falls,
we calculate its motion, the rock doesn’t.
In our previous approach we characterized in a simplified
society of agents the effects of different learning styles on the
statistics of their opinions about a set of issues. We will call the
artificial data set the data obtained by simulation of the agents.
The analytical and numerical results were compared to data gath-
ered by the Moral Foundation Questionnaire project of Haidt
and collaborators (http://www.yourmorals.org), to which we will
refer as the empirical data set. Agents learning with an algo-
rithm that treated new and corroborative information in the same
way, exhibited (a) less dispersion of opinions, (b) longer times to
readapt under changes of the issues under discussion and (c) his-
tograms of opinions very similar to those of self declared conser-
vatives in the empirical data set. On the other end of the spectrum
of cognitive styles, agents that could be thought to score higher in
an Openness personality trait, since they gave more importance
to new data than to corroborative data, (a) showed greater disper-
sion of opinions, (b) readapted faster after changes of the issues
and (c) were statistically similar to self declared liberals.
Note that we avoided the difficult task of theoretically pre-
defining conservative or liberal. We just took a pragmatic route,
comparing the results of our model with empirical data where
subjects had declared their belief about their positions in the
political spectrum. In other words, a society of agents is classi-
fied as conservative or liberal by the proximity of their statistical
signatures to those obtained from the Moral Foundation Ques-
tionnaires of groups who believe and declared to be of a certain
political affiliation.
In this paper we address the following question: why are differ-
ent cognitive strategies present in the population? Distal causes
could be such as the advantages of societies with a higher cohe-
sive set of values due to conservatives and shorter readaptations
due to liberals. If we ask for more proximate causes, genetics
or heterogeneous social interactions are possible explanations. A
discussion by Smith et al. [33] illustrates the long path between
genetics and opinions about specific issues, including four inter-
mediate levels: biological, cognitive/information processing, per-
sonality/values and ideology with the environment influencing
each one.
Fowler and collaborators presented evidence for interactions
between genetics and politics. In Dawes and Fowler [34] they
link the DRD2 dopamine receptor to partisanship hereditability.
More relevant to our present study, is their analysis of data [35]
from the National Longitudinal Adolescent Health study indicat-
ing that a certain allele (7 repetitions long allele) of the dopamine
receptor gene DRD4 may have just that kind of influence. For
those having two copies of the allele, the number of friends during
early age condition the probability of their self declared political
affiliation as an adult. The direction is such that those that had a
larger number of friends are associated to a larger probability of
being a liberal as an adult.
Here we aim at explaining the diversity in moral valuation
within our agent based framework by adopting an information
theory point of view, in particular we consider an artificial soci-
ety composed by interacting Bayesian information processing
agents. Each agent has a set of social neighbors and exchanges
information in the form of opinions about issues. Learning
means that when the information brought by the opinion of a
social neighbor arrives, there are certain changes in the weights
attributed to each moral dimension.
The main results about the learning process following from
this approach are two. First, that the learning algorithm is not
static but adaptive. It depends on the number of opinions to
which an agent has been exposed in social interactions. Second,
that for different numbers of such opinions, the difference of
the ensuing learning algorithms can be described by the differ-
ent modulation given to opinions that carry novelty of informa-
tion relative to opinions that carry corroborative information.
Figure 1-Left shows the modulation function for different num-
ber of social interactions. The modulation function is a measure
of the overall scale of the changes of the weights for the moral
dimensions elicited by a particular issue and opinion of a social
partner. Including the possibility of errors in communication,
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FIGURE 1 | The modulation function depends on a measure of
novelty and on the number of social opinion exchanges. Left:
Complete confidence on the information received. Right: Agent assumes
noisy communication with received opinions randomly inverted with
probability of 20%. The vertical axes are modulation functions and
horizontal axes represent agent prior opinion (h) times the sign (σ ) of an
opinion received in an exchange. Social interactions with opinions where
hσ < 0 bring new information, those with hσ > 0 are corroborative. The
different curves are drawn for several exchange counts measured by ρ
which increases as shown by the arrow (↓). The modulation function
changes from almost a constant, for very small number of opinion
exchanges, to a very asymmetrical form where repetitive information
causes almost no change at all and novelty leads to intense modulation
as far as hσ is not too negative, when distrust sets in.
a Bayesian learner with the information that there might be
imperfect communication, acts with suspicion and ignores dis-
agreeing opinions on issues about which it has a strong opinion
(Figure 1-Right).
The agents of our model are Bayesian during an early win-
dow of time we call the formative phase. Each “young” agent is
exposed to a random number of social information exchanges. At
the end of the formative phase the learning algorithm stops evolv-
ing and agents enter the social influence phase. Agents, each with
its particular fixed learning algorithm determined by the ran-
dom socialization in the formative phase, exchange information
about a set of issues and continue learning. After a time where a
steady state has been achieved, we collect statistical information
about the state of the society in the form of histograms of opin-
ions (the artificial data set, ADS). A similar set of statistics can be
extracted from the set of questions about moral issues (the empir-
ical data set, EDS) collected by Haidt and collaborators from the
Moral Foundation project (http://www.yourmorals.org) as done
in Caticha and Vicente [13], Vicente et al. [14]. Numerical com-
parisons of the statistics permit identifying a class of agents with
a group of respondents with a given declared political affiliation.
The conclusion is that the number of opinion exchanges in the
formative phase is correlated with the political affiliation of the
corresponding group of the responders. Agents with large num-
ber of opinion exchanges in the formative phase are identified
with liberals after the social influence phase, those with a small
number are identified with conservatives.
In Section 2 and Appendix we present the mathematical
aspects of the theory, first the Bayesian algorithm of learning
that evolves during the formative phase, then the description
of the social influence phase where agents interact. In Section 3
we present the results and describe the comparison to the data
obtained from theMoral Foundation questionnaires.We end this
paper with a discussion of the results, the limitations of the theory
and possible extensions.
2. Model and Methods
2.1. Adaptive Agents
Each agent is endowed with a learning system and a set of
weights. They exchange information, learning and teaching at
different instances, about a set of issues, represented each by a
set of numbers. Each number represents the bearing of the issue
on one of the moral dimensions. The dimension of the moral
space, according to MFT is around five or six. The development
of the mathematical theory can be done for a general number
of dimensions dm. A choice has to be made in order to com-
pare with data, and since we are only comparing with a set of
questionnaires of conservatives and liberals, will use dm = 5 in
the numerical part of the calculations. So, a statement or issue
to be morally judged, at a time labeled by µ is represented as
a vector in moral space xµ = (x1,µ, x2,µ, x3,µ, x4,µ, x5,µ) with
five components. For a particular agent, call it i, the moral state
of the agent, called the moral matrix in MFT, is also a vector
ωi = (ω1,i, ω2,i, ω3,i, ω4,i, ω5,i).
Moral judgements are taken to be intuitive, fast, not based on
intricate rules. We suppose opinions to be constructed by the
average of the components of the issue, weighted by the values
of the moral dimensions: hi,µ =
∑dm
a= 1 ωa,ixa,µ is the opinion of
agent i about issue xµ. Furthermore, we introduce the sign, for or
against, of the opinion σi,µ = sign(hi,µ) about the issue.
We model social encounters when agent i receives informa-
tion yµ = (σj,µ, xµ) emitted by the social partner j. Since the
length of the vector xµ does not alter the opinions σ , we take all
issues to be unit length.
CallDµ = {y1, y2, ....yµ} the set of all such pairs received until
that time. To take into account our limited access to information
we have to use a probabilistic framework. Let P(ω|Dµ) describe
our knowledge of the vector of moral dimensions ω conditional
on the information the agent received until now Dµ, composed
of all the pairs up to time µ. Now a new pair yµ+1 is received
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and the probability of having a particular moral dimension ω
changes. That is the essence of learning. The basic relation of
inference is drawn from Bayes theorem. If P(ω|Dµ) is the proba-
bility posterior to the consideration of the data set Dµ and prior
to the inclusion of the information contained in the pair yµ+1,
the basic assumption in Bayesian learning is to use the old poste-
rior P(ω|Dµ) as the new prior. Then we can write for the updated
distribution of the receiving agent
P(ω|Dµ + 1) ∝ P(ω|Dµ)P(σi,µ + 1 = σj,µ + 1|ω,Dµ, xµ + 1)
(1)
The likelihood P(σiµ + 1 = σj,µ + 1|ω,Dµ, xµ + 1) describes the
probability that agent i would have opinion σiµ + 1 = σj,µ + 1
about issue xµ + 1 if its moral vector were ω.
For simplicity we consider an approximation where the prob-
ability distributions are multivariate Gaussians. This family can
be described by two objects: a mean vector (ωˆ) and a covariance
matrix (C). Now the dynamics of learning can be simply written
by giving the changes in these two quantities due to the incor-
poration of the information in the example yµ + 1. After some
manipulations (see the Appendix and 36), the learning dynamics
of agent i is described in terms of the components by
ωˆa,µ + 1 = ωˆa,µ −
∑
b
Cab,µ ·
∂Eµ
∂ωˆbµ
, (2)
Cab,µ + 1 = Cab,µ −
∑
cd
Cac,µCbd,µ
∂2Eµ
∂ωˆc,µ∂ωˆd,µ
(3)
and Eµ, that can be called the learning energy or cost, is given by
Eµ = − ln
〈
P(hµ|ωˆµ + u)
〉
(4)
where hµ =
∑
a ωˆa,µxa,µ+1 is the opinion of the agent about
issue xµ+1 before receiving the opinion of the social partner. The
average, represented by the angular brackets, is over the gaus-
sian variable u with zero mean and covariance Cab,µ. Note that〈
P(hµ|ωˆ + u)
〉
µ
is also called the evidence. It is in the likelihood
that enters the information about how an issue and a moral vec-
tor give rise to an opinion and the noise process that is corrupting
the communication.
Different types of noise can enter in the communication pro-
cess. Here we suppose the case of multiplicative noise where a
fraction ǫ of the opinions are inverted. The form of the learn-
ing potential that results from assuming agents that are Bayesian
optimal learners can then be written as
Eµ(z) = log
(
ǫ + (1− 2ǫ)8
(
z
xTµ + 1Cµxµ + 1
))
(5)
where z = σj,µ + 1hi,µ and8 is the cumulative distribution of
the gaussianN (0, 1). To simplify the interpretation of the results,
at the expense of small degradation in the performance of the
learning algorithm we consider the case where the covariance has
the the from Cµ = Cµ1, an overall factor Cµ times a unit matrix.
In this approximation xTµ + 1Cµxµ + 1 = Cµ. Then the dynamics
becomes
ωˆa,µ + 1 = ωˆa,µ − xa,µ + 1σj,µ + 1Cµ
∂Eµ
∂z
, (6)
Cµ + 1 = Cµ − C2µ
∂2Eµ
∂z2
. (7)
This dynamics and variations for other learning scenarios
has been extensively analyzed in Kinouchi and Caticha [37],
Opper [36], Kinouchi and Caticha [38], Copelli and Caticha [39],
Vicente et al. [40], Biehl et al. [41], Biehl and Schwarze [42],
Caticha and de Oliveira [43], de Oliveira and Caticha [44], and
Engel and den Broeck [45]. We now make some comments that
are relevant for our present purposes.
We introduce the modulation function (Figure 1)
Fmod(z) = − Cµ ∂Eµ∂z and write the dynamics as
ωˆa,µ + 1 = ωˆa,µ + xa,µ + 1σj,µ + 1Fmod(zµ), (8)
Cµ + 1 = Cµ + Cµ
∂Fmod(zµ)
∂zµ
. (9)
Learning is now seen as a modulated Hebbian learning, where
changes in the weights are done in the direction of the vector
xµ+1, if the social partner’s opinion σµ+1 about it is positive and
in the opposite direction it the opinion is negative. In Figure 1,
the modulation function
Fmod(zµ) =
(1− 2ǫ) exp− z
2
µ
2C2µ
ǫ + (1− 2ǫ)8
(
zµ
Cµ
) (10)
is plotted as a function of z. Note that z takes positive values if
the opinion of the agent and its social partner are the same and is
negative if there is disagreement. If the absolute value of z is large
the agent can be said to be very sure about its opinion since small
changes in the issue will not change its classification.
But more strikingly, the modulation function depends on
C. In Figure 1 we present Fmod(z) for different values of ρ =
1/
√
1+ C2, a convenient variable since it takes values between
zero and one. It is close to zero when the agent’s opinion has
probability around one half of agreeing with that of the social
partner. As learning occurs, ρ increases toward one. It can be
shown that ρ is related to the probability eg of the opinions being
different on a random issue, and eg goes to zero as ρ → 1. In
particular eg = 1π accos−1ρ for large dm and uniform and inde-
pendently distributed examples and it remains a useful variable
in other conditions.
2.2. Formative Phase
Here we describe within a Bayesian framework the way agents
process information. We suppose that issues are parsed into a
set of five numbers. An issue labeled µ is represented by xµ ={
xaµ
}
a = 1,...5, each xaµ describing the bearing of its content on
a moral dimension. Agents emit opinions in a fast, automatic,
intuitive manner independently of intricate if-then rules. In the
model this is done by summing over the five dimensions the
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content of each moral dimension of the issue, weighted by the
importance the agent attributes to each foundation. The moral
state of agent i at time t, called the moral matrix in MFT, is also a
vectorωi(t) =
{
ωa,i(t)
}
a=1,...5. The opinion of agent i about issue
µ is hi,µ =
∑5
a=1 ωa,ixa,µ and its sign σi,µ = sign(hi,µ) shows
whether an agent is for or against an issue.
During a social encounter in the formative phase an agent i
receives information yµ = (σj,µ, xµ) emitted by the social part-
ner j. Learning occurs in order to decrease disagreement over
issues. Within this learning scenario, we hypothesize that evo-
lutionary pressures to increase the prediction of the opinions of
others would select learning algorithms near Bayesian optimal-
ity (see 46 and 47). As shown in Appendix the resulting learning
algorithm that approximates a full Bayesian use of the available
information, can be described in two different ways. One as a
motivational algorithm where a cost or energy like function E
is decreased by the changes elicited by learning. The other as a
modulated Hebbian learning algorithm with the central concept,
the modulation function Fmod (Figure 1), being a measure of the
importance attributed to a given issue and the opinion of the
interlocutor. In terms of the moral matrix ωˆa(t) and a measure
of the full social experience C(t), both ways are:
ωˆa,i(t + 1) = ωˆa,i(t)− xa,µ + 1σj,µ + 1C(t)
∂Eµ
∂zµ
,
= ωˆa,i(t)+ xa,µ + 1σj,µ + 1Fmod, (11)
C(t + 1) = C(t)− C(t)2 ∂
2Eµ
∂z2µ
,
= C(t)+ C(t)∂Fmod
∂zµ
. (12)
The modulation function and the cost are related by
Fmod(z,C) = − C(t) ∂Eµ∂z where zµ = σj,µ+1hi,µ mea-
sures the concurrence/disagreement between agents i, the
receiving agent, and agent j the opinion emitting agent. C(t) is
related to the width of the posterior distribution and decreases as
learning occurs. We also use ρ(t) = 1/
√
1+ C(t)2, a convenient
variable since it takes values between zero and one. It is close to
zero when an agent had a small number of social encounters and
approaches one as the number increases. Hence the modulation
function and the cost are functions of z and ρ.
The main results of this paper derive from the fact that the
modulation function of the Bayesian algorithm (1) is not the
same throughout the learning period and changes as more infor-
mation is incorporated and depends on the number of social
encounters; and (2) it depends on the novelty that the opinion of
the social partner carries. These two aspects are clear in Figure 1.
Right, where the modulation function is plotted as a function of
z = hiσj, for different fixed values of ρ, which measures the num-
ber of social interactions. Note that z = |hi|σiσj measures the
strength |hi| of the opinion held by i and the σiσj which is positive
if the opinion σi prior to learning agent i is the same as the that
of agent j and the information is corroborative, and z < 0 if the
opinions are opposite and the arriving information is considered
a novelty.
2.3. Social Influence Phase
We consider that the information exchanges in the formative
phase occur at random and thus the effective ρ for each agent is
a random number. Now we freeze the evolution of the modula-
tion function, ρ or equivalently C is fixed at a particular value for
each agent. We consider the agents to start a new phase in their
lives where the value of ρ does not change anymore. The agents
in the formative phase learned to learn and now they just learn
from each other. The validity of this supposition as something
that represents the developments of adolescents has to be inves-
tigated in an independent way. It loosely rings with Piagetian
overtones [48].
We also consider the fact that people tend to interact with the
likes [49]. The likes here wouldmean agents with similar learning
styles, so we consider as a nonessential simplification, a system of
agents all with the same ρ each one in a site of a social lattice,
exchanging information and then investigate the effect of chang-
ing ρ. The dynamics of information exchange is analogous to
some proposals found in the literature [50–52] and differs from
Vicente et al. [12], Caticha and Vicente [13], Vicente et al. [14]
in the learning process that here follows the Bayesian algorithm
described above.
We suppose that a society discusses a set of P issues. Parsing
of an issue into a vector might be subjective, expressed by the fact
that agent i obtains a vector xi. Exchange of information between
agents is about the average vector
Z ∝ 1
P
P∑
µ = 1
x
µ
i , (13)
which we suppose for simplicity to be independent of the agent,
since fluctuations due to subjective parsing, if unbiased, tend to
cancel out. We call Z the Zeitgeist vector since it captures the
contributions of all issues that are currently being discussed by
the model society. Without any loss it will be normalized to unit
length. The opinion of agent k about the Zeitgeist is
hk = Z · wk (14)
and its sign is denoted by σk = sign(hk). We now consider
a Metropolis-like stochastic dynamics of information exchange.
Pick at randomone agent, call i. Pick its social partner, call it j uni-
formly from its social neighbors. Now choose a dm dimensional
vector u drawn uniformly on a ball of radius κ . A trial weight
vector is defined by
T = wi(t)+ u|wi(t)+ u|
(15)
and accepted as the new weight vector, wi(t+ 1) = T if the learn-
ing energy : 1E : = E(T, σj) − E(wi(t), σj) ≤ 0. If 1E > 0
the change is accepted with probability exp−β1E . In analogy
to Equation (5)
E(wi, σj) = log
(
ǫ + (1− 2ǫ)8
(
hiσj
C
))
(16)
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This is looped randomly over the whole population. A techni-
cal comment is that it is not obvious if this dynamics leads to an
equilibrium state since the energy E is not symmetric with respect
to the interchange of the two actor agents: the emitter and the
receiver of the information. However, numerically, order param-
eters rapidly converge to values that remain stationary during
thousands of iterations, a time scale that we consider sufficient
to study a steady state and further to consider the effects of Zeit-
geist changes and readaptations. Within certain limits, κ controls
the acceptance rate and thus the time scales to reach stationary
values.
The value of β sets the scale of fluctuations of the energy E .
If β is large, even small changes 1E have large effects and large
changes will not be possible, and if β is small, then large fluctua-
tions may be easily accepted. Our interpretation is that β serves
as a pressure to accommodate and conform to the opinion of oth-
ers. Large β means strict conformity, while in a small β regime,
tolerance to fluctuations in conformity are accepted.
The conjugate parameter β , determines the scale of tolerance
to fluctuations in the cost E , that is, it determines how important
it is to conform to the opinions of others agents and eventually
sets the scale of fluctuations of an agent’s moral vector around
the Zeitgeist.
2.4. Simulation
The artificial data is generated by the following procedure. We
suppose that agents are characterized by a learning algorithm
parametrized by ρ depending on the number of social interac-
tions they experienced during the formative phase. We also sup-
pose that agents only interact with counterparts holding equal ρ.
We choose a random social undirected graph from an ensem-
ble here taken to be generated by a Barabasi-Albert model with
N = 400 andm = 10. Our results are not strongly dependent on
the details of the social graph topology [14].
Agents start the social influence phase with moral weights that
are represented by unitary vectors ωi with random positive over-
laps with a fixed Zeitgeist vector Z. The social influence dynamics
is implemented as a Markov Chain Monte Carlo process as fol-
lows. At each step an edge 〈ij〉 of the social graph is randomly
and uniformly chosen. One of its vertices (let it be i) is then
marked as the influenced agent with probability 1/2. The influ-
enced agent chooses a random unit vector ω′i and changes her
moral weights ωi with probability given by min{1, exp (−β1E)},
where 1E = ∑j∈neigh(i) [E(hi, σj)− E(h′i, σj)]. Note that the
agent has complete access to his opinion hi, but only knows the
sign of the influencer opinion σj. Observe also that the pressure
parameter β regulates the acceptance rate in the transition. High
pressure β makes moral representation changes more difficult.
Data are collected after the system reaches equilibrium. We
typically wait Tterm = 6 × 104N interactions before gather-
ing uncorrelated samples for time averaged opinions hi that are
used to build the histograms depicted in Figure 2. To guaran-
tee that samples are uncorrelated we calculate autocorrelation
times τ and then select properly spaced Tterm/τ samples. The
whole procedure is repeated a n times until 500 independent
samples are drawn (n = 4 being the minimum for the data we
report). Our codes and preprocessed data are available at https://
github.com/jonataseduardo/BayesianSociety. Raw data for the
Moral Foundations survey can be obtained from http://www.
yourmorals.org.
2.5. Confrontation Between Artificial and
Empirical Data
A society of agents is characterized by the values of ρ, measuring
the effective socialization in the formative phase, and of β that
sets the pressure on the society during the social influence phase.
While in a society different agents with different ρ’s and feeling
different β ’s will interact, it is a reasonable first approximation
to consider that people will more likely interact in a meaningful
manner with those that are more similar.
In a steady state of a society of agents, changes in the moral
matrices still occur, but the distribution PADS(h|ρ, β) of opinions
about the Zeitgeist are stable in time. From 15,000 MFT ques-
tionnaires (MFTQ, see [14] for a description of this data set) we
obtained the data and the following information. (i) {wa}a=1...5,
the (normalized) weights of the moral matrix and the political
affiliation of each respondent. (ii) The empirical Zeitgeist vec-
tor (Ze = {Za}a=1...5) defined as the average weight vector of
the most conservative group. (iii) The empirical Zeitgeist opinion
he = ∑a waZa for each respondent. (iv) The empirical distribu-
tion of opinions PEDS(h|pa) is obtained for each of the political
affiliations pa.
A distance between the two distributions is measured
D(ρ, β; pa) =
∑
h∈bins
(
PADS(h|ρ, β)− PEDS(h|pa)
)2
. (17)
by summing the quadratic difference over a set of bins of h.
Figures 2, 3 are obtained by identifying the value of pa for the
regions on the ρ − β space where D(ρ, β; pa) is smallest. If the
smallest D(ρ, β; pa) is larger than a threshold value of identifi-
cation (e.g., 0.1) then the point is not identified to any political
affiliation.
3. Results
3.1. Learning Dynamics
We started with Bayesian learning and obtained two equivalent
descriptions of the learning dynamics describing changes in the
weights of the moral dimensions. The dynamics described in
Equation (11) can be seen to be a gradient descent: changes of
the weights are in the direction of decreasing a quantity E that
can be interpreted as an energy, a cost or a pain.
We claim that this motivational (or utilitarian) form of learn-
ing can be useful to understand what is occurring. Then for each
example the change occurs in the direction which tends to reduce
the error of classification, to increase conformism or to reduce
pain derived from disagreement. But it is just a mathematical
fact that may go along uninterpreted and be described just as a
Bayesian inspired learning. We can describe the falling rock as
moving along a trajectory that decreases potential energy. It is not
the rock that is being utilitarian or motivated to reduce an energy,
but it is our description using energy that seems utilitarian. The
motivation lies in our third person description.
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison with empirical data. Empirical opinions
(histograms in orange) correspond to the overlap between moral
weights obtained by MFT questionnaires and the average weight of
the most conservative group (Zeitgeist direction Z). The histogram
obtained by simulating social influence in a social network with
homogeneous learning styles (homogeneous ρ) and computing overlaps
between moral weights of a the agents and a given Zeitgeist direction
(Z = (1,1,1,1,1) in the simulation) are represented by the black line.
In each graph we find ρ that best fits the empirical histogram for
pressure β = 3.8 and for each political affiliation group. Simulations are
performed on a Barabási-Albert network with N = 400 and average
degree 20.
3.2. The Modulation Function
By using the idea of themodulation function we described (Equa-
tion 12) the same learning dynamics differently. The modulation
function measures the importance of the information carried by
the example. It could be thought in a loose way as representing
the signal from something like an amygdala, which would sig-
nal more strongly in case the example causes surprise due to the
novelty of an unexpected result.
In addition to measuring surprise, it is striking that it depends
on ρ(t) = 1/
√
1+ C(t)2. What is striking about a ρ dependent
modulation is that in a static scenario and for an agent with only
one social partner we can prove [37] that ρ increases with the
number of information exchanges, and this still holds numeri-
cally when learning from several correlated social partners.
We now analyze the case shown in Figure 1-Left for noise-
less communication. At the beginning of the learning process
the modulation function is flat. Every piece of information, every
example receives the same modulation. Being right or wrong is
of little consequence in the manner in which the information is
incorporated. As learning occurs, from the information exchange
with social partners, the modulation function decreases for pos-
itive z and increases for negative z. Examples that carry new
information start getting a higher modulation. Those that were
predicted correctly, are less effective in fostering changes in the
weights of the moral vector. Examples carrying new informa-
tion make larger impacts, those that corroborate the opinion of
the agent, have a smaller influence. As ρ increases this effect is
amplified.
In Figure 1-Right a noisy communication channel is intro-
duced.With probability ǫ (equal to 0.2 in the figure), the received
opinion is flipped. But the agent doesn’t know which specific
examples are corrupted. The Bayesian algorithms permits the
incorporation of this information, the result is a distrust effect.
If the agent is very sure about its opinion (large absolute value of
z), but it differs from that of the social partner (z < 0), it tends to
disregard the example by doing smaller changes in the weights.
This increases with the value of the noise level and with ρ.
To sum it up, the modulation has three characteristics which
we list in decreasing order of importance. The modulation func-
tion depends on
1. Novelty/Corroboration: a measure of whether the example
carries new information ( z < 0) or is corroborative (z > 0),
2. Socialization in the formative phase: a measure of the number
of information exchanges (ρ),
3. Trust/distrust: a measure of the reliability attributed to the
social partners. Given ǫ, if z is too negative, the example is not
considered new information but rather it is distrusted and its
effect is small.
Frontiers in Physics | www.frontiersin.org 7 April 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 25
Caticha et al. For whom will the Bayesian agents vote?
FIGURE 3 | Model vs. data. Model results: Panels (A) and (C)
show results from the model. Panels (B) and (D) are observational
results from data published in Settle et al. [35] and Amodio et al.
[28], respectively. (A) Model: Political affiliation (pa = 1-Liberal, pa =
7-Very Conservative) is correlated to ρ, which is a measure of the
number of social information exchanges in the formative phase of
the agents’ lives. This occurs for a wide range β values. (B) Data:
Number of friendships in people with the two alleles of DRD4-7R
correlates with liberalism [35]. (C) Model: Difference between
average modulation in novel and corroborative situations,
1F = 〈Fmod 〉novelty − 〈Fmod 〉corroboration. correlates with liberalism (see
Section 3.4). (D) Data: magnitude of ERN difference between
novelty and corroboration in a go-no-go task from Amodio et al.
[28] correlates with liberalism.
We have analyzed the simple dynamics where the covariance
is represented by a single parameter C or equivalently ρ. This is
probably a good approximation but it is reasonable to assume
that the dimensions may be interdependent. For example caring
for a member of the group may be larger than for a member of
another group, also cheating an authority figure may be different
than cheating a commonmember of the group. This can be mod-
eled by off diagonal terms in the covariance matrix, that mix the
moral dimensions of care and loyalty, in the first case or the fair-
ness and authority dimensions in the second. It is not clear at this
point whether this means that there are different neural circuits
that deal with the dimensions but are interconnected, or if there
exists combinations of dimensions that are independent. This last
option seems attractive from a mathematical point of view, being
just another case where diagonalization is useful. However, the
existence of interacting circuits is probably more in accord with
the fact that evolved language attributes specific names to them
and not to their combinations.
3.3. The Political Affiliation of Bayesian Agents
Agents, of course, do not have a political affiliation. However,
we can measure the distribution of opinions PADS(hi|ρ, β) after
the formative phase, about the Zeitgeist vector for a society of
agents all with the same value of ρ and pressure β . Now we have
a statistical signature that can be compared to a similar signature
extracted from the data of the Moral Foundation questionnaires
for each political affiliation group. This is similar to the method-
ology we used in Caticha and Vicente [13] and Vicente et al. [14].
This results in the identification for fixed β , of the measure ρ of
the formative phase, and the self-declared political affiliation of
the respondents of the questionnaires. This is done for several
values of β and the result is shown in Figures 2, 3. It is clear that
the populations of agents with small value of ρ, or small number
of social information exchanges, are close to conservatives and
those populations with high ρ or large number of social infor-
mation exchanges, are more likely to be identified with liberals.
Note that this is not a one to one identification.We are not saying
that a given agent’s value of ρ determines political affiliations, but
rather that this subset of the population will have a distribution
of opinions consistent with such identification.
3.4. Comparing ERN and the Modulation Function
The modulation function determines the size of the
weight changes during learning. We define the average
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of the modulation function for novelty 〈Fmod〉novelty and
〈Fmod〉corroboration by
〈
Fmodnovelty
〉
=
∫ 0
−∞ Fmod(z)P(z)dz∫∞
−∞ Fmod(z)P(z)dz
,
〈
Fmodcorroboration
〉 =
∫∞
0 Fmod(z)P(z)dz∫∞
−∞ Fmod(z)P(z)dz
. (18)
For a uniform distribution of examples, and with the normaliza-
tion of ω, the distribution P(z) of z = hσ , is the gaussian distri-
bution with zero mean and unit variance. Since the modulation
function depends on ρ, the difference
1F = 〈Fmod〉novelty − 〈Fmod〉corroboration (19)
can be identified to a political affiliation. This is shown in
Figure 3C. This is the closest we can come theoretically to defin-
ing within the model a quantity similar to the Error Related
Negativity (ERN) measured by Amodio et al. [28] which reports
differences between measured EEG signals of unexpected and
expected situations conditional on self-declared political affilia-
tions. In Figure 3D we show the results from Amodio et al. [28]
for the magnitude of the ERN signal vs. political affiliations.
3.5. The Phase Diagram
The phase diagram is the instrument used to represent the vari-
ety of possible collective behaviors of systems composed of many
interacting units, in particular a society of agents. The phase
boundary separates regions of totally different properties. In
Figure 4-Left we show the phase diagram in the space of param-
eters (ρ, β). Above the transition line which is the lower line,
the society of agents has an ordered phase. That there is some
coherence of opinions in the society is shown by the fact that the
average value of the opinions is not zero. Below the transition line
the model society is disordered in the sense that opinions are so
varied that they average to zero, opinions are not shared, the Zeit-
geist is not clear. This phase, the opposite of the ordered phase,
resembles the anomie of Durkheim. The stripes follow regions
where the statistical signatures are similar to a certain political
affiliation group.
3.6. Readaptation Times
What is it that conservatives conserve? If a society of agents iden-
tified with conservatives (low ρ) were to readapt after changes
faster than one identified with liberals, our theory would have to
be thrown away. But it is a result of our theory that liberal-like
societies are faster than conservative-likes in readapting.
Several approximately equivalent ways of defining relevant
measures of readaptations times can be introduced and we have
looked at two such measurements and obtained similar results.
After a steady state was achieved and the steady state distribution
PADS(h|ρ, β) is measured, the Zeitgeist Zold is changed to a new
Zeitgeist Znew. Call this time t = 0. After a sweep of information
exchanges of all the agents, t increases by one unit, the distri-
bution of opinions about the new Zeitgeist Pt(h) is measured. A
distance between the two distributions is measured
D(t) =
∑
h∈bins
(
Pt(h)− PADS(h|ρ, β)
)2
. (20)
by summing the quadratic difference over a set of bins. As usual
the relaxation is exponential so we parametrize D(t) = D0e−t/T
in terms of the adaptation time T which depends on ρ and β . For
more about this measure see [14].
A second possibility is the correlation time, defined by mea-
suring the decay in time of the time correlations. These are
defined by the difference between the expected value of the prod-
uct of the moral vector at two different times and the product of
FIGURE 4 | Phase diagram and relaxation times. Left: The phase
diagram in the space ρ, a measure of the complexity of socialization vs.
the pressure β. The stripes represent regions of the space of parameters
where agents could be statistically identified with a group with a given
political affiliation. The lower line represents the boundary between order
(above) and disordered (below) societies. Below the transition line, and for
very large β, no identification with MFT questionnaire respondents was
found. Right: Color coded relaxation times after changes in the set of
moral issues. Note that at the transition relaxation times are very large.
This is called critical slowing down. For the agents identified with
respondents of the MFTQ, the lowest times correspond to those liberal
identified agents and the largest times to conservative identified agents.
The line just above the transition shows the locus of minimum correlation
time as a function of β, for fixed ρ.
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their expected values c(t) = 〈m(t′ + t)m(t′)〉 − 〈m(t′+ t)〉〈m(t′)〉
which also decays exponentially as c(t) ∝ exp(−t/τ ) with a
characteristic relaxation time τ (β, ρ). Figure 4-Right shows the
result of measuring numerically the relaxation times of the differ-
ent populations. At the transition line the relaxation time grows
beyond any limit as ever increasing populations are considered.
This is called critical slowing down. Bellow the transition, the sys-
tem is disordered and after the Zeitgeist change, it returns very
quickly to the steady state. This temporally and spatially uncor-
related region is uninteresting from the point of view that no data
for an analogous population in this region is currently available.
Above the transition line, as we move to larger β with fixed ρ,
τ goes down very fast, attaining its minimum values near the
regions of ultraliberals and then has a monotonous rise into the
conservative region. The shape of the regions where τ remains
approximately constant are similar in shape to the regions in the
phase diagram identified with a given political affiliation. This
suggests that political affiliation could be empirically character-
ized by collective relaxation time that increases as the political
spectrum is transversed from groups conventionally labeled as
liberals to those labeled as conservatives.
3.7. Threats: Conservative Shift Under Increase
of Pressure
The pressure parameter β determines how important it is to
conform to the opinions of others. A more detailed modeling
of the agents could make a difference between informational or
normative peer pressure. Or the differences between situational
or dispositional attributions of β . Economical or environmen-
tal pressures could influence how the the social environment is
perceived. Coarsely, β describes the overall motivation that sets
the scales of adaptation of beliefs. However, it is set, it controls
how strongly the agent should conform to other opinions or to
the overall current Zeitgeist. Technically, it determines the scale
of tolerance to fluctuations in the cost function E . Equivalently β
sets the scale of fluctuations of an agent’s moral vector around the
Zeitgeist.
We canmodel the effect of an external event that threatens the
group to which the agent belongs by considering that the pres-
sure β increases. The effects of the threat in the political affiliation
of the agents, shown in Figure 5-Left is that the population will
shift toward the conservative end of the spectrum.We supposed a
fixed distribution of the number of social information exchanges
ρ, and the effect on the distribution of political affiliations before
and after a threat which increases the peer pressure β . Our model
predicts also that under the perceived decrease of an external
threat the populations will shift toward the more liberal region.
We have defined the effective number of moral dimensions of
a group with a given political affiliation. This is done by averaging
the weights over all members of the population and multiplying
by the number of moral dimensions dm = 5, Dm = 1N
∑
a,j ωa,i.
For groups of agents that are identified with conservatives, the
effective moral dimension is near 4.8 . For those identified with
liberals it is near 3.5. Both increase under increase of the peer
pressure parameter β as shown in Figure 5-Right. This is in qual-
itative agreement with experiments reported in Bonanno and Jost
[53], Nail and McGregor [54], Nail et al. [55] and further work in
Van der Toorn et al. [56].
4. Discussion
The main characteristic of Entropic inference and the Bayesian
approach to information theory is that the mathematical struc-
ture to represent beliefs in the absence of complete information
[57, 58], if manifest inconsistency is to be avoided, is probabil-
ity theory. As presented in Section 2, a Bayesian study of the
learning dynamics of moral classifications can be described as the
changes in the weight parameters for each dimension that lead to
a decrease in the cost, interpreted as psychological discomfort,
caused by differences of opinions.
FIGURE 5 | Threats. Left: The level of conservatism changes with
pressure. If the population has a distribution of social encounters as
shown in the bottom panel, the resulting distributions of political
affiliations changes, for different pressures as shown in the left panel.
Right: The effective number of moral dimensions for two values of the
pressure, before and after an external threat. If a threat leads to
increased pressure, the statistical signature of liberals agents will look
more like that of conservatives.
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TABLE 1 | Predictions of the model of Bayesian Agents.
Variable Prediction
Cognitive style: novelty ≈ corroborations Correlates with conservatism
Cognitive style: novelty > corroborations Correlates with liberalism
Social complexity in formative phase ρ Correlates with liberalism
Correlation times τ Correlates with conservatism
Increase in pressure β Liberals look statistically more like
conservatives
Left: Variables refer to the Bayesian Agent Model. Right: Compared to the data from the
Moral Foundations project.
The main result we presented here is that the cognitive style
of the Bayesian agent depends on the complexity of the social
interactions in the formative phase and cognitive style induces a
statistical association to political affiliation. The formative phase
is a mimic of the pre-adolescent phase in the life of an agent and
the social influence phase is a mimic of the post-adolescence.
During the social influence phase the agent’s cognitive style is
crystallized, so that it ceases to change, although the agent is still
capable of learning, then it follows that statistically the agents
when identified with respondents of the MFTQ, with the social
complexity of the formative phase being positively correlated
with liberalism. This is exciting since in Settle et al. [35] the
number of childhood friends is positively correlated to liberal-
ism, at least for those that have two alleles of the DRD4-R7 gene.
They cautiously withhold from claiming that a gene for political
ideology was identified and just claim that evidence points to a
gene-environment interaction.
Within the context of Settle et al. [35] what is the genetic
interpretation of our results? Our methods do not address this
problem. Genetically, having two long R7 DRD4 alleles, may
contribute to making the number of friends a proxy for social
complexity in the formative phase. But some other genes may
contribute to Openness, with influence on the number of friends,
thereby influencing the cognitive style with respect to the differ-
ences of learning novelty and corroborations. But our approach
does not address this mechanism nor those by which other phe-
notypes become conservative or liberal. What we say is that
Bayesian optimal learning predicts that number of social interac-
tions in the formative phase will correlate with liberalism in the
social influence phase. But, why should agents be Bayesian opti-
mal? An answer can be given based on the results of first, [37]
where the functional optimization of the learning process was
obtained, second [36], where a related algorithm was shown to be
the online version of the Bayes algorithm and third [46] where,
using evolutionary programming, the authors showed that per-
ceptrons evolving under pressure for having larger generaliza-
tion ability, were driven to learning algorithms that resembled
Bayesian optimal algorithms both in functional form and perfor-
mance. Thus, if learning algorithms for moral classification from
examples, are subject to evolutionary pressures for better gener-
alization, Bayesian optimal like algorithms will be approximated.
Cognitive styles will then depend on social interactions at the ear-
lier phase in the life of the agent. A question that remains is why
there would be a formative phase, for learning how to learn and
setting overall parameters, and a social influence phase, for actual
learning. These questions are outside of our scope and will need
other methods and inputs.
What are the predictions of the model? These are summarized
in Table 1. Relaxation times were never used in the theoretical
formulation of the problem. They are a physical consequence of
the social information exchanges and hence a prediction of the
model. Different cognitive styles, through social interactions, lead
to different adaptation times. The existence of a phase transition
between an ordered moral phase and a moral disordered phase
might not be observable since societies morally disordered might
not exist. However, this model can be applied to other cultur-
ally relevant landscapes, where groups on both sides of the divide
might be found. A question that remains is if in those contexts,
pressure will lead to Bayesian optimality resulting in cognitive
style diversity.
Another prediction of the model is that under an increase of
β , the peer pressure, a society as a group will tend to seem statisti-
cally more conservative, as shown in Figure 5. This effect of peer
pressure increase might be behind the results of Bonanno and
Jost [53] and Nail andMcGregor [54] about the increased conser-
vatism of subjects that were exposed to the 9/11 attack. However,
Nail et al. [55] show that there is no need for social interaction in
order to becomemore conservative, suggesting that our interpre-
tation of β as peer pressure could be extended to a self-regulated
parameter that is adjusted dynamically from information about
social context.
An empirical definition and consequent measure of pressure
might be done following the methodology of Gelfand et al. [59]
where nations were classified on a tight/loose scale. Analysis of
morality data sets for individual countries could point out if
our pressure and their tight/loose scale are related. Since we use
only USA citizens questionnaires, we are not able to address this
question here, leaving the issue for a forthcoming paper.
An important characteristic of our model is that it is semanti-
cally free. Just or loyal in themathematical space where the agents
are defined are concepts devoid of meaning. We believe that this
aspect has to be addressed from an evolutionary perspective in
order to understand the emergence of the dimensions and hence
provide our mathematical backbone of a semantic dressing.
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Appendix
Bayesian inspired learning algorithms
For the learning set Dt =
(
y0, . . . , yt − 1
)
of independently
chosen vectors and their opinions, the likelihood is a product
P(Dt|ω) =
t − 1∏
i = 0
P(yi|ω) (A1)
where ω is the set parameters to be inferred. The data comes in
ordered pairs yt = (σj,t, xt) where σj,t is positive if agent j consid-
ers issue xt as a morally acceptable issue and negative otherwise;
xt = (x1t , . . . , xNt ) is a five dimensional vector. Our choice of
N = 5 is determined by Moral Foundation theory.
Bayesian inference derives from the application of Bayes the-
orem in order to incorporate information that permits updating
from a prior to a posterior distribution:
P(ω|Dt) =
P(ω)P(Dt|ω)∫
dω′P(ω′)P(Dt|ω′)
(A2)
In Online learning we consider the updating of the distribu-
tion due to the addition of a single example pair yt + 1
P(ω|Dt + 1) =
P(ω|Dt)P(yt|ω)∫
dω′P(ω′|Dt)P(yt|ω′)
. (A3)
The amount of memory needed to store the whole posterior can
be prohibitively large and following Opper [36] we consider a
simplification where the posterior is constrained to belong to
a parametric family, which we take to be the N dimensional
multivariate Gaussian.
If at a certain stage our knowledge is codified into one such
Gaussian,
PG(ω|Dt) =
1
|2π detCt| 12
× exp
(
−1
2
(
ω − ωˆt
)T
C−1t
(
ω − ωˆt
))
(A4)
a Bayesian update will in general take the posterior out of the
Gaussian space. Then a new Gaussian posterior is chosen is such
a way that the information loss is minimized. Thus, the learning
step is comprised of two sub-steps:
• New example drives the posterior out of the Gaussian space:
P(ω|Dt + 1): = P(ω|Dt, yt) =
PG(ω|Dt)P(yt|ω)∫
dω′PG(ω′|Dt)P(yt|ω′)
(A5)
• Project back to Gaussian space:
P(ω|Dt + 1) → PG(ω|Dt + 1) (A6)
The projection step is done using the Kullback-Leibler
divergence or equivalently, by maximizing the cross
entropy:
KL[P(ω|Dt + 1)||PG(ω|Dt + 1)]
= ∫ dωP(ω|Dt, yt) log P(ω|Dt + 1)PG(ω|Dt + 1) (A7)
The minimization of the KL divergence results in projecting into
the Gaussian with the same mean and covariance vector as the
non-Gaussian posterior:
ωˆt + 1 =
∫
dωωP(ω|Dt+1)P(yt|ω)∫
dωP(ω|Dt + 1)P(yt|ω)
Ct + 1 =
∫
dωωωTP(ω|Dt + 1)P(yt|ω)∫
dωP(ω|Dt + 1)P(yt|ω)
− ωˆt + 1ωˆTt + 1. (A8)
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